One
of the more intriguing empirical findings in recent years is evidence that a number of Third World economies experience a positive relationship between military expenditures and overall rates of economic growth.
While this result has been found in a number of individual studies, no satisfactory explanation has been put forth --presumably defense expenditures have both positive spin-offs, tending to support growth, and a number of negative aspects such a crowding out of private sector investment which tend to reduce overall growth.
It is something of a tautology therefore to argue that those countries experiencing net positive benefits from defense expenditure simply have an environment where the net positive effects predominate.
The purpose of this paper is to show that Third World arms producers differ considerably in terms of budgetary priorities from their non producer counterparts.
More importantly it can be demonstrated that differences in budgetary priorities between these two groups of countries is consistent with the fact that arms producers tend to obtain net positive benefits from military expenditures while non-producers find their overall rates of growth declining with increased allocations to defense. ( 6) what are the opportunity (7) which domestic groups and areas are more likely to benefit or to be hurt by this impact and (8) what are the policy implications of this impact.
The purpose of this paper is to make a first attempt at answering several of these questions by integrating two major areas of research the defense growth debate and the defense budgetary tradeoffs debate that despite their rather obvious connection have been undertaken quite independently from one another.
More specifically the analysis below shows that:
1.
When examining Third World countries as sub sets   BUDGETARY IMPACTS OF THIRD WORLD ARMS PRODUCTION   603   a domestic arms industry,  one finds sharply  diverging results as to the impact of the military burden on growth.
2.
The budgetary tradeoffs between defense and nondefense expenditures differ considerably depending on whether a country is an arms producer or not.
3.
Differences in the budgetary process in arms producing and non-arms producing countries are likely to account in part for the contrasting impact that increased military burdens have with respect to each group of countries. The main contribution of the analysis below to the ongoing defense growth debate is the identification of a clear and unambiguous mechanism leading from changes We have been unable to establish whether the net growth effects of defense expenditures have been positive or not.
On the basis of all the evidence we suspect that they have been positive but we have not been able to prove this.
Heavy defense expenditure does not, however, appear to have been associated with lower growth rates, even after adjusting for differences in foreign aid receipts and investment rates and this in itself is surprising.
The positive relationship found by Benoit between the defense burden and economic growth could, however, be spurious because economic growth could be caused by the inflow of other types of foreign resources not just aid.
There has also been considerable skepticism 
2.
3.
4.
These variables included:
The capital output ratio CICOR), here defined as the ?rowth in GDP 1970-81 divided by the growth in investment over the same period. Lim [ 34] found this variable to be particularly useful in his defense growth analysis. As with the case of the defense/growth relationship, the arms producers show ( 
